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SHIFTING CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL (IN)JUSTICE IN
NEPAL
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyse and situate the changing discourses of social
(in)justice in the context of political transition and restructuring process that Nepal has
gone through since 2006. This paper discusses the origin and development of the discourse
and analyses how its meaning has changed over time. As the paper argues, the earlier
discourses of social justice in Nepal can be linked to the Hindu and Buddhist notion of
dharma and various other ethnic cultural traditions. After Janandolan-I in 1990, the policy
and practice of social justice began to be equated with the principle of equality, which
was based on the assumptions of sameness. After Janandolan-II in 2006, the public
conception of social justice has shifted towards a more vocal emphasis on social equity,
inclusiveness, proportionate representation and participatory decision-making. The article
provides empirical manifestations of social injustices in Nepal, linking them with various
discourses and traditions of justice in the early and modern historical, socio-cultural and
political contexts. It is hoped that a thorough understanding of historical shifting of public
conceptions of social (in)justice in Nepal will be useful in guiding the country’s future
public policies towards inclusive restructuring and equitable development.
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INTRODUCTION1
There are several forms of social and
cultural inequalities and injustices in
contemporary Nepal and these result from
differences mainly based on caste, ethnicity,
gender, language, religion and culture, and
region (geography). These exist on top of
the problem of inequality of class division,
which is perhaps the most ubiquitous
dimension of economic disparity. The
hierarchical and highly stratified structure
of Nepalese society based on these
differences has perpetuated socio-cultural
exclusions and discriminations against
various groups (such as the poor, women,
Dalits, Janajatis and Madhesis) who have
been denied equitable access to resources
and opportunities.
It is against this backdrop that we need to
understand public conceptions of social
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(in)justice in contemporary Nepal.  This is
because the way we think about justice is
grounded within historical, social, political,
economic and cultural relationships (which
are often unequal) among different actors
in a society. In other words, because of the
complicated and relative nature of the
concept of justice,  it is crucial that issues of
justice and injustice be understood against
the socio-economic and cultural context of
multifaceted, historical and structurally
embedded problems.
Despite half-a-century of donor-driven
development projects in Nepal with a large
amount of foreign aid, there has been little
progress in the well-being of Nepalese, as
demonstrated by the slow pace of
improvement in living standards.2 National
statistics for economic growth and human
development become even gloomier when
they are disaggregated, as the figures reveal
widening gaps between the advantaged
regions (and) or people and the
disadvantaged ones (World Bank and DFID,
2006; UNDP-Nepal, 2009, p.2).  Nepal’s
uneven and inequitable development pattern
has, in various degrees, favoured urban
rather than rural areas and people, and
particular communities and castes over
others (higher caste Brahman-Chhetris over
Janajatis, Dalits and Muslims; and Pahadis
or hill origin people over Madhesis or plains
origin people), men over women, eastern
and central development region over far
western, and so on. In particular, the plight
of Dalits highlights the severity of inequitable
development in Nepal as their place has been
constantly at the bottom of all national
averages (DFID, 2007; BK, 2006, pp.6-10).
Similarly, hill Janajatis, Muslims, and women
in Nepal suffer from more severe
inequalities in terms of most development
and health indicators, and lack fair access
to opportunities and resources (UNDP-
Nepal, 2009, p.2).
It is in this context of inequity and injustice
in Nepal that the country has frequently
experienced political conflicts, as is evident
from the chain of events in much of its recent
history, particularly Janandolan-I or
people’s movement-I (1990), Maoists’
Janayudda or People’s War (1996-2006),
and Janandolan-II (2006). During these
political movements, social injustices
arising from continued exclusion and
inequality of various groups provided ample
grounds for the hitherto excluded groups to
fight against an exclusionary state, in
addition to other causes (political instability,
authoritarian tendencies, poverty,
corruption, bad governance, mounting
foreign debt etc). While Nepal is navigating
through a political transition and
restructuring since 2006, it is timely to
discuss the shifts in the discourse of social
justice over time in the country. This might
lead to a better understanding of the root
causes of injustices and inequities, against
which the current constitution building and
state restructuring should be targeted. This
might also offer insights into how and why
these shifts matter to those who wish to
steer the transition in particular ways.
2 According to the Human Development Report 2009, Nepal ranks 144 out of 182 countries with a
Human Development Index value of 0.553 (UNDP, 2009, p.173). About 32 per cent of the population
still live below the poverty line with inadequate or no access to basic needs such as food, health
and education.
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EARLY JUSTICE TRADITIONS IN
ANCIENT NEPAL AND THEIR
INFLUECE
With a majority of Hindus (80.6 per cent)
amongst its population, followed by
Buddhists (10.7 per cent) (CBS, 2001, p.3),
both sharing many common cultural
traditions, Nepal’s traditional notions of
justice, cultural beliefs, and practices largely
have their historical roots in Hindu and
Buddhist philosophy. In Addition, Nepal also
has various indigenous ethnic groups with
their own distinctive cultures and justice
traditions.3 With the concept of dharma,
classical Hindu philosophy is centred on the
principles of justice and morality, albeit
sometimes imperfectly and unjustly
according to modern traditions (as is the
case with the hierarchical caste structure).
According to Hindu and Buddhist
philosophy, dharma constituted the
religious and moral doctrine of rights and
duties of each individual, and it provided
guidance and administration of justice in
much of Nepal’s ancient history.
Although the notion of dharma guides
individual actions, it emphasises promoting
collective good for the universal order. By
embracing the desire to promote the
common good with a conception of higher
law and justice, the concept of dharma
differs to some extent from modern justice
system, which is predominantly influenced
by the liberal tradition (with the focus on
an individual’s free-will) and rational choice
theories. In non-Western cultures such as
in Nepal, the individual is not perceived to
be a unitary free agent, as it is in the Western
liberal tradition. Instead, the definition of self
is more a function of the social context.
The concept of dharma is derived from the
rules and laws encrypted in the
dharmashastra (ancient Hindu texts). Early
Hindu texts such as the Vedas, the Puranas,
the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, and the
Gita cite anecdotes of ancient kings and sages
with their just traditions, truthfulness and
fairness, and provide various references to
justice traditions and practices in early
Hindu culture. Based on Hindu mythology,
justice traditions in Nepal can be traced back
as early as to the Satya Yuga, the pre-historic
time during which the development of Hindu
civilisation and culture is believed to have
originated (Wright, 2000, p.77).4 King Manu,
3 In Nepal, there are 103 castes and ethnicities (including 61 Janajatis) who speak at least 92
different languages (CBS, 2006, p.6). Besides Hinduism and Buddhism, there are more than eight
different religions being followed in the country: Islam (4.2 per cent); Indigenous Kirat religion
3.6 per cent); Christianity (0.5 per cent); and other groups (0.4 per cent) (CBS, 2001, p.3).
4 Although very little is known about the early history of Nepal, legends and documented references
reach back to the first millennium BC. Hindu scriptures establish the country in antiquity as an
independent political and territorial entity in the Bharat Barsa (Indian sub-continent). During the
time of the Kirats (before 250 AD), Nepal’s political boundary was said to have extended to Tista
in the East and Trisidi in the West. However, before the present political entity appeared in the
eighteenth century, the designation 'Nepal' was largely applied only to the Kathmandu Valley and
its surroundings. During the reign of the Mallas, Nepal’s boundary was expanded widely, into the
Tarai and western Tibet, before disintegrating into small principalities. Later, these became
known as Baisee (i.e. the twenty-two principalities) and Chaubise (twenty-four principalities)
(Whelpton, 2005, pp.24-25). Kathmandu Valley was split in three kingdoms from the 15th to 18th
century.
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the first ruler of Satya Yuga, was said to be a
noble man who ruled areas around Bharat
Barsha with his wisdom and fairness and
his justice rules were encoded in the form
of Manusmriti (codes of Manu).5
During the time of Buddha (c. 563-483 BC),
who was born to a Shakya King family in
Lumbini of present-day Nepal, the notion of
dharma was interpreted further. Buddhism
had its origins in the teachings of Buddha
and dharma (dhamma) in Buddhism refers
to the right ways of living (achieving self-
awakening, eradicating greed, hatred and
delusion). Buddha provides eightfold noble
path to spiritual awakening or
enlightenment: right understanding, right
thought, right speech, right action, right
livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness,
and right concentration. Accordingly, a
dharmic or dhammic person (i.e. a righteous
person) is the one who is impartial,
understands the reality or truth and follows
the natural law.
Ancient Nepal was ruled by the Kirats
(before 250 AD), who comprised of ethnic
groups such as the Limbu, Rai, and Yakkha
who were originally from eastern Nepal and
are considered the first of the known ruling
dynasties of the Kingdom of Nepal.6 Their
sacred and holy text, the Mundhum (also
known as Kirat Veda) became the main
source of law and provided important
guidelines for governance and the delivery
of justice (Khanal, 2000, p.4). Various kings
of the Lichhavi dynasty (250-1140 AD) in
Nepal, originally from the Hindu region of
Baishali in India, made many laws (in the
form of historical texts of Sutras and Smritis)
in accordance with the Hindu scriptures
(such as codes of Manu) under which the
government and administration of justice
was conducted (Whelpton, 2005, p.18;
Khanal, 2000, p.6). Based on their Indo-
Aryan heritage, the Lichhavis introduced
Hinduism as the official religion of Nepal
after the overthrow of Kirats. The first
Lichhavi monarch, King Supuspa, is also
thought to have introduced a caste-based
system for the first time in ancient Nepal
which was modelled after the already
existing organisation of Hindu society in
5 Some of the provisions in Manusmriti include: rules relating to law; rules of action in normal
times; fourfold dharma of a Brahman; rules of action for a king; rules of action for Vaishyas and
Sudras (‘low’ castes); rules of action in times of adversity; and rules relating to penance. A king
was described as the upholder of justice and above the natural justice system. Brahmans (priest
caste) were given concessions in fines and punishments.  While certain verses glorified the
position of women, other verses were against their freedom (for example, it discouraged women
from reading Vedic scriptures). Similarly, in Treta Yuga (the second age in Hinduism), King Janak
(father of Hindu Goddess Sita) of Mithila (present-day Janakpur in the Tarai of Nepal) was widely
known for his fair administration of justice. Nepal, an adventurous place full of high mountains
and great forests, was also chosen for reclusive meditation by noted sages of Hinduism at various
times such as Biswamitra, Agastya, and Valmiki, who provided early framings of what constitutes
justice and morality through their writings in early Hindu literature.
6 Some historians, however, believe that Gopals (literally, the ‘cow-herders’) and Mahishpals
(‘buffalo-herders’) were the first and second ruling dynasties of Nepal respectively (Regmi, 1977,
p.33).
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North India.7 The influence of the concept
of dharma and the prominence of the caste-
based Hindu structures continued
significantly through subsequent dynasties
such as the Mallas (1140-1768) and the
Shahs (post-1768). During the Malla period,
those who belonged to upper Chhetri
(warrior) caste in Hindu hierarchy and
were originally from the western hills of
Nepal, believed that the principal duty of a
monarch was to follow dharma and protect
and preserve justice traditions (Whelpton,
2005, p.21).
The well-documented case of early justice
traditions in ancient Nepal is more frequently
linked to the Gorkha Kingdom for its
righteousness. Gorkha, the seat of Shah
dynasty and the birthplace of modern Nepal,
was also considered the seat of justice at that
time in Nepal, as is evident from a common
saying even today: "nyaya napaye Gorkha
janu" (‘Those who are denied justice should
go to Gorkha’) (Khanal, 2000, p.12). This is
credited to King Ram Shah who was
renowned to be a very noble man who would
dispense justice and display fairness. King
Ram Shah, who ascended the throne in 1606
and ruled the Gorkha Kingdom for 26 years,
was also one of the country’s earliest
reformers of land revenues and the inventor
of the penal code in Nepal (Khanal, 2000, p.11).
With this brief review of justice traditions
in ancient Nepal, it is clear that the discourse
of justice was mainly derived from the
concept of dharma in consonance with the
religious values and codes, and other non-
formal laws derived from cultural traditions.
There were not, as such, written codes or
constitutions agreed in the form of a social
contract as is highlighted by modern justice
theories. With the increased influence of
religion also came an entire cultural system
centred on the king as the upholder of
dharma. This political concept of the king
as the righteous centre of the political
system would continue to have a powerful
impact in later years in modern Nepal. While
dharma in general provided altruistic moral
doctrine, Hindu cultural traditions also
inherently barred certain groups such as
women, and lower castes and various
ethnic communities outside the caste
hierarchy from having equal rights.8 Thus,
in ancient Nepal, even the principle of
equality, and the basic and minimum criteria
of modern justice traditions were ignored
on many occasions due to preferential
treatments meted out mainly on the basis of
caste structure. These early traditions of
exclusions and biases continue to influence
and reinforce unjust social arrangements in
contemporary Nepalese society.9
7 Although the caste-system was originally based on the division of labour, occupation structure
and family history, it created far-reaching injustices and discriminations that are perpetuated
even in modern-day Nepal.
8 For example, Brahmans were exempted from capital punishment, whereas Dalits and ethnic
Janajatis were punishable even for small offences. Similarly, sati practice was the worst form of
gender inequity, in which the wife of a higher caste Brahman had to burn herself in the pyre of her
dead husband.
9 It is useful to elaborate how some of these historical discriminations are reinforced by social
practices even in present-day Nepal. Unequal gender relations stem from patriarchal worldview
embedded in traditional socio-cultural structures, which still define formal and informal rules for
women’s participation. Caste and ethnicity differences in Nepal result from the norms and socially
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JUSTICE TRADITIONS IN MODERN
NEPAL (AFTER 1768)
Although early justice traditions influenced
by Hindu culture continued to guide most of
Nepal’s modern history, issues of equality
and justice remained more restrained and
silenced in Nepal’s post-1768 political
economy. After King Prithvi Narayan Shah’s
‘unification’ of Nepal with the aggressive
invasion of various small principalities,
many of which were ruled by ethnic rulers,
the hegemony of Hindu philosophy, cultural
traditions and thus caste-based structure
flourished much more than ever in Nepal’s
history.10 A continued war-like situation
driven by the ambition of unification
(which was followed later by successive
rulers as an ongoing process of empire
building) meant that demands for equality
and concerns for justice were rare.
The questions of civil liberties and social
justice were more deliberately suppressed
in public discourse during the more than a
century long oligarchic rule of the Ranas
(1846-1951). The Ranas adopted a feudal
and autocratic form of politics and followed
the deliberate strategy of stagnation and
seclusion, suppressing education and
isolating Nepal from the rest of the world
(Whelpton, 2005, pp.61-85). This strategy
was aimed not only at controlling any
internal voices of possible dissent, but also
at preventing potential external influences.
Under the closed politics of the Ranas,
justice traditions were also based on the
essential religious provisions. For example,
the first codified law that applied to a
unified Nepal was the Muluki Ain (Civil
Code) of 1854, which went through a
number of amendments in several
occasions, took legal approaches for non-
formal and customary laws without
substantial changes in earlier values and
practices (Khanal, 2000, p.19). The Muluki
Ain formally created two categories of
citizens: the Tagadharis or the upper-caste
Hindus who monopolised privilege; and the
Matwalis (today's Janajatis) and the 'lower'
castes. It thus legally validated the caste
system and helped preserve the socio-
cultural status quo as defined by the Hindu
elite rulers.
In 1951, the Rana regime had to ultimately
succumb to the growing pressure from a
new wave of consciousness in Nepal
influenced by the ongoing independence
movement in neighbouring India (especially
in the 1940s) (Whelpton, 2005, p.73). The
influence and achievements of the Indian
defined practices of dominant caste groups that define the degree and form of discriminatory
practices towards disadvantaged castes. In particular, the plight of Dalits is serious as they are
still considered ‘untouchables’ and are prohibited in many instances of social life (e.g. from their
entrance into temples and from touching public drinking water taps and wells). Linguistic
discrimination arises from the historical domination of Nepali language over other native tongues,
which consequently results in the exclusion of non-Nepali speakers (mainly Janajatis). In similar
way, religious discriminations have been perpetuated through monopoly of Hinduism over other
faiths and belief systems for years.
10 Many in Nepal, however, believe that King Prithvi Narayan Shah acknowledged and promoted the
pluralistic nature of Nepal with a mosaic of different ethnic communities and cultures. His popular
quote as cited in his Divyopadesh (a book of 'divine teachings' of Shah) "Nepal char barna
chhattis jatko phulbari ho" (‘Nepal is a garden of four castes and thirty-six sub-castes’) is taken to
support this argument.
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movement for freedom, external influence,
and later experience of democracy in India
served as a major catalyst for similar
movements and demands in Nepal. A
disenchanted public widely participated in
the protests organised by two main parties,
the Praja Parisad and the Nepali Congress,
whose leaders (many of them were Banaras-
educated) had been personally involved in
the Indian independence movement, while
secretly operating against the Ranas from
India. For the first time in Nepal’s history,
discourses of social justice itself (samajik
nyaya) were mentioned prominently in the
major demands of the opposition groups.
These were associated with demands for
democracy (prajatantra) and equality
(samanata), arising from external
ideologies of freedom and suffrage rights
with their roots in European enlightenment,
and which in turn facilitated popular revolt
against the regime.  Following the fall of the
Ranas, Nepal was open to the rest of the
world for the first time in its history, more
particularly after its membership of the
United Nations in 1955. With the removal
of the Ranas, political discourse in Nepal
was dominated by promises for
participatory constitution-making in the
form of constituent assembly elections to
write a new constitution that would address
demands of social justice and democracy.
However, these promises did not
materialise.
Following some years of political
bargaining, power-sharing and transition,
Nepal experimented for the first time, albeit
briefly, with multiparty democracy in 1959.
The new Nepali Congress government
announced some populist social justice
policies (such as nationalisation of private
lands and forests assigned to the Ranas and
the ruling elites) (Whelpton, 2005, p.95;
Ghimire, 1998, p.65). Similarly, some biased
provisions in Muluki Ain (1854) were
scrapped. New provisions in the revised
Muluki Ain sought to promote social
harmony and declared all persons
theoretically equal in the eyes of the law,
thus ending legal discrimination based on
caste, creed, and sex. It also permitted inter-
caste marriages, abolished ‘untouchability’,
granted the right to divorce, and applied
uniform family law for all religious
communities. The justice system and
jurisprudence began to be modernised and
largely modelled in line with the British-
Indian legal system (Khanal, 2000, p.34). 
This brief democratic experience, however,
did not last long. When King Mahendra
introduced his self-styled monopolistic
panchayati system in 1960, there was no
room for any alternative voices of political
dissent. In particular, panchayati system
encouraged the ideology, policy and practice
of ‘sameness’ with ‘one nation one culture’,
consisting of a centralised (unitary) state,
dominant culture (Hindu) and one language
(Nepali). Any demands for justice and
equality were suppressed as protests were
banned and were many times brutally dealt
with. The three decades of authoritarian rule
of party-less panchayati system (1960-
1990) with domination and injustice under
monarchy represented another déjà vu of
repressive political culture in most of
Nepal’s modern history (with centralised
state structure of post-1768 period and the
authoritarian Rana regime from 1846-
1951). As a result, it took some time for
issues of justice and equality to reappear in
the political landscape of Nepal.
However, despite the presence of a different
political environment, the country’s
exposure to Western globalising influences
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since the 1950s, established an overt link
between Nepal and the West which, in turn,
continued to guide and influence Nepal’s
future modernisation and development
agenda (Panday, 1999). Ideas of progress,
economic growth, and development
became a major theme in national
discourses.  With Nepal’s growing
dependence on foreign aid and involvement
of different international agencies also came
the heavy penetration and influence of
international players (mainly the US, UK and
India) (Acharya, 1998; RRN and CECI-
Nepal, 2007, p.6). Nepal also became a
tourist attraction for mountaineers and
hippies and an exotic holiday destination for
international tourists throughout the sixties
and seventies. External influence, mainly
through the national and local projects
funded by international agencies which
often came with their own priorities,
methods, benchmarks, conditionalities and
evaluation criteria, eventually contributed
in making the country a colonised cultural
space. Ordinary people in Nepal had to
constantly negotiate and live in these hybrid
cultural situations. In this context, meanings
and understandings of certain ideas and
concepts such as those of social justice
remained no longer confined within local
frames of references, and were constantly
influenced by globalised ideas.
JUSTICE DISCOURSE IN POST-
JANANDOLA-I PERIOD (AFTER
1990)
It was only in the 1990s that an agenda for
social justice (samajik nyaya), albeit
subsumed within the larger struggle for
multiparty democracy, re-emerged in the
public and political discourse in Nepal, most
prominently during the People’s Movement-
I (Janandolan-I) in 1990.  One of the main
reasons for social justice issues to reappear
late in the political discourse in Nepal can
be attributed to the way the authoritarian
rules and values conditioned the ordinary
people to tolerate the status quo. Another
reason was because the literacy rate was
still low and most of the older generation
were accustomed to ancient traditions
rooted in the concept of karma with
fatalistic orientation, or fatalism (Bista 1991,
pp.76-100). Many Hindus in Nepal still
attach the concept of karma to the present
sufferings (including cases of injustices and
inequalities) they face with their own
supposed past actions in earlier forms of
life. Although this belief makes people
constantly judge their present actions with
regard to their fate in the next life, at the
same time, submission to one’s fate
encourages the tradition of overlooking
current injustices and inequalities. This
belief together with the old ideas of justice
based on caste and authority can also be
linked to the persisting culture of nepotism
and clientelism in politics and general life
in Nepal: if someone’s karma is right, they
are lucky to have their afno manchhe (one’s
people) around for any help and support.
Within the overarching term of social justice
(samajik nayaya) during the post-
Janandolan-I period, were the ideas of
equality (samanata) and inclusion
(samabeshikaran) which dominated
political discourses in Nepal. It was the time
when the dominance of select classes of
ruling elites and upper-caste Brahman-
Chhetris in national political and socio-
cultural structure began to be questioned by
various groups such as the poor and the
landless, women, Dalits and Janajatis. The
rapid ascendency of ethnic politics largely
in the form of indigenous movements during
this period signalled the growing importance
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of ‘politics of recognition’ in making social
justice claims in Nepal. Similarly,
constitutionally granted freedom of speech
and association, political and civil rights
coupled with increasing involvement of the
outside agencies and the donors, and a
mushrooming of NGOs, civil society
organisations, and mass-media, provided
more public awareness on the issues of
social justice, through concern for human
rights, and equality of opportunity. With the
emergence of a multiparty democracy and
a new constitution, policies such as
economic liberalisation and institutional
pluralism were also introduced with the
support of multilateral and bilateral aid
organisations that became powerful
stakeholders in the policy regime, most
particularly in the areas of development,
democracy, and poverty alleviation (Panday,
1999; Acharya, 1998).
Although the democratic politics of post-
1990 provided more civil liberties and
political space to raise social concerns by
diverse groups, the dominant understanding
and hence policy imperative for successive
governments on the issues of social justice
was by now that of ‘equality’ to all, in which
everyone was entitled to equal treatment.
In this context, equal opportunity and ‘basic
human needs’ were the fundamental rights
constitutionally granted to everyone,
irrespective of their class, caste, ethnic
origin and gender (GoN, 1990, Article 11).
However, there were no provisions for
special treatment to various disadvantaged
groups, such as in the form of reservation
or proportional representation. Similarly,
despite the fact that the constitution enabled
greater freedom of expression for minority
religions and cultures, it still legitimated the
country as the world’s only Hindu kingdom
retaining the hegemonic monopoly of
Hindu culture in Nepalese society. Even
though the cultural and religious rigidity of
the Hindu culture and caste system started
to erode slowly, mainly among the educated
youths and in cities, the influence of Hindu
culture was still significant among the older
generations and in rural areas.
During the 1990s, the policy and practice
of equating social justice (samajik nyaya)
demands with the principle of equality
(samanata) based on the assumptions of
sameness, though a seemingly neutral and
‘just’ arrangement, did not address the root
causes of the persisting inequalities. In
reality, it perpetuated the status quo and
reinforced the widening gaps between the
historically marginalised groups and the
dominant groups even further. The practice
of interpreting social justice as ‘sameness’,
was to some extent influenced by the
persisting ‘one nation one culture’ discourse
inherited from the unitary and singular
approach of the panchayati period. It was
insufficient to address the complex,
contested and multifaceted forms of
injustice existing in a multi-caste and ethnic,
multi-religious, multi-cultural and multi-
lingual country such as Nepal.
Moreover, extremely factionalised politics
with frequent changes of the government
became a characteristic feature of
multiparty democracy in Nepal in the post-
1990 period. This allowed the continued
capture of the central political stage by the
ruling elites and conservative elements.
Although reducing poverty and removing
inequalities became the national policy
rhetoric of successive democratic
governments, these promises did not
translate into any concrete actions. They
offered only partial cosmetic changes on
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what were the fundamental problems of
social injustice and inequalities and could
not fulfil public aspirations, particularly of
the disadvantaged groups. Due to the
continued apathy to the problems faced by
historically marginalised people, women,
excluded caste and ethnic people, the poor
and those living in remote areas of Nepal
became more disgruntled and dissatisfied
with the inadequate functioning and
outcomes of multiparty politics.
The grievances of various disadvantaged
groups could have been addressed only by
radical structuring of the state in a more
equitable and just political framework.
Their more radical imaginaries of social
justice and the vision of ‘just’ Nepal, as is
still highlighted in several indigenous
movements and ethnic politics, is through
combining the ‘politics of redistribution’
and ‘politics of recognition’, a politically
challenging objective. In their ‘identity
politics’, envisioning ‘just’ institutions
requires re-interpretation of the notion of
equality largely on a material basis, which
is not only about a general rejection of all
forms of discriminations and injustices but
also a more radical provision for fair and
equitable (re)distribution of resources and
opportunities.
Under the ‘rules of the game’ of the
multiparty system, the ‘majority’ continued
to rule over the ‘minorities’, of which the
country is mostly made up of, thus neglecting
the voice of various groups (Geiser, 2005,
p.8; Gellner, 2003, pp.1-30; Karki and Seddon,
2003, pp.3-48). Furthermore, political crisis
in Nepal in the post-1990 period, mainly
fuelled by the Maoists’ rebellion in the form
of the decade-long Janayudda (1996-2006),
meant that peace and stability remained the
priority, yet elusive goal for successive
governments. This not only sidelined issues
of social justice, but seriously curtailed
people’s basic rights and freedom. In fact, the
core fundamental issues for the elusive goals
of peace and stability, as documented in the
Maoists’ popular 40-point demands before
the start of Janayudda, were the radical
agendas of social justice, eradication of all
forms of social discriminations and
exploitations, land redistribution, and
restructuring of the state (Gellner, 2003,
pp.1-30; Karki and Seddon, 2003, pp.3-48).
When King Gyanendra assumed executive
powers in 2002 and 2005, whatever
restricted political rights and civil liberties
people were accustomed to during a decade
of multiparty politics, were further
curtailed.11 Repressive and authoritarian
nature of King Gyanendra’s direct
administration later provided premises for
the Maoists and other political parties to
organise and mobilise campaigns against
monarchy, which gave rise to galvanised
protests in the form of Janandolan-II of
2006. The political set-up of Nepal has
drastically changed since then.
PUBLIC CONCEPTIONS OF
JUSTICE IN POST-JANANDOLAN-II
PERIOD (AFTER 2006)
It was after Janandolan-II that a more vocal
emphasis on social equity (as opposed to a
mere equality that Janandolan-I had
partially offered), issues of fairness,
inclusion (samabeshikaran) and justice,
with eradication of all forms of
11  King Gyanendra became the monarch when King Birendra and his entire family were killed in the
Nepalese royal massacre that occurred on 1 June 2001.
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discrimination, featured in the guise of anti-
monarchy protests and pro-democracy
demonstrations. Since more than a decade’s
experience with prajatantra after
Janandolan-I did not bring any considerable
effect to soothe the disadvantaged and
ordinary people’s grievances (rather, it
brought more turmoil and instability in the
country), many people had felt
disenchanted and deceived by the euphoria.
During Janandolan-II, dissatisfaction with
the previous political change of 1990 that
could not bring radical transformation to
the structure of the unjust and inequitable
Nepalese polity and society was expressed
with the invention of a new word for ‘real’
democracy, loktantra. Loktantra (literally
meaning rule of people) differs from
prajatantra (democracy) in the sense that
the latter treats people only as subjects (of
the ruler). A major difference in the
loktantra based notion of justice of the post-
2006 period was its stress on social rights
(linked to notions of samanata (equality)
and samabeshikaran (inclusion)) and the
‘politics of recognition and redistribution’
by hitherto disadvantaged groups, whereas
prajatantra could only offer the political
rights (e.g. freedom of expression, right to
vote, individual choice etc.).12 With calls for
loktantra , ordinary people in Nepal
understood it as a harbinger of radical
changes in the social and political structure
of the country with social justice, fairness,
and inclusion occupying centre stage in the
national political conversation. Discourses
of proportional representation, equitable
participation and empowerment of hitherto
disadvantaged groups have also dominated
the restructuring agenda of the country.
Following the political change of 2006, public
discourse on social justice in present-day
Nepal has perhaps reached a higher profile
than at any other time in Nepal’s history, as
is evident from the almost-daily
demonstrations and regular strikes by various
groups with demands of fair treatment,
effective participation and a proportionate
share of resources and benefits.
The talk of building a loktantra-based ‘new
Nepal’ - one built along federal and
multicultural lines rather than uni-cultural
and centralised - has become the latest
sloganeering post-Janandolan-II, which can
be understood as a decentralised, inclusive
and a just nation (RRN and CECI-Nepal,
2007, p.41). Along with this call for a ‘real’
loktantra and a ‘new Nepal’, there is now a
consensus among major political actors
that Nepal cannot become a modern nation-
state without acknowledging and addressing
layers of exclusionary practices based on
class, caste, ethnicity, region, and gender.13
12 It can be argued that prajantantra based notion of justice has its links to neoliberalism (such as
in the ideologies of aid agencies), which can come into conflict with the loktantra based notion of
justice that can only be realised through more radical proposals (such as inclusion, proportionate
representation, decentralisation, federalism and political autonomy).
13 What was once considered the popular rhetoric upheld only by the ultra-left Maoists, social justice
in Nepal has now become a popular sloganeering for not only the leftists such as the Communist
Party of Nepal-United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML), but also of the centre-right Nepali Congress
Party and other parties belonging to the right of the political mainstream such as the conservative
Rastriya Prajatantra Party. However, Maoists are ahead in raising radical issues such as the right
to self-determination, cultural and regional autonomy, and linguistic, religious, and gender equality
(elimination of patriarchy, eradication of Brahman-Chhetri domination, and caste-based
untouchability) more vociferously than other mainstream non-ethnic political parties in Nepal.
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These sentiments are well-documented and
addressed in the 2007 Interim Constitution
of Nepal, which recognises the
discrimination and injustices against
women, Dalits, Janajatis, Madhesis, and
other disadvantaged groups and clearly
states the need to give due respect to these
groups in the process of restructuring the
state (GoN, 2007, Article 33D). The historic
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2006)
between the government and the Maoists
also clearly states the way forward to
reorganise power relations based on a
proportionate and federal-based system of
political governance while writing a new
constitution by the Constituent Assembly,
which is the first step towards achieving an
egalitarian societal structure. Successive
governments post-Janandolan-II (interim
government of seven major political parties,
Maoist government after the Constituent
Assembly elections and the 22-party
coalition government) have sought to
address issues of social justice based on
socio-political agendas stipulated in the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2006)
and the Interim Constitution (2007). These
governments have also made efforts in
various degrees to reduce cultural, political
and socioeconomic exclusion while signing
agreements with various agitating groups
(such as Madhesis, Janajatis, and Tharus).
These agreements specify the need to
ensure a fair representation of various
excluded groups in the political system in a
way in which they can participate
effectively and change the outcome in their
favour. A review of political programmes
and manifestos of major political parties
during the Constituent Assembly elections
of 2008 also shows their common concerns,
at least in their commitment towards the
establishment of a full-fledged democratic
federal republic of Nepal. However, they
differ remarkably in their vision of
federalism in Nepal.14
Hence, at least in the rhetoric of political
leaders and popular tea-house discussions
of ordinary people, social justice has been a
hotly debated issue in present-day Nepal.
These debates are taking place in different
sites and forms from which ‘new
discourses’ of social (in)justice are being
produced and circulated: from intra-party
discussions to interparty agreements, from
national level interactions to village level
meetings, from mass media (newspapers,
TV and radio) to various internet forums,
and from heated exchanges between
parliament members (on provisions of
future constitution) to frequent
demonstrations by various groups (on
premises of perceived injustice and
inequalities).
However, access to these platforms and
participation in debates is still limited and
insufficient for a majority of needy
stakeholders (i.e. the poor, women, Dalits,
and other disadvantaged groups) who
require the most from current and future
social justice policies and programmes.
14 For example, the Maoists have been campaigning for ethnic-based autonomous states with right
to self-determination. Nepali Congress and other centre-right parties oppose ethnic-based
federalism but lack a clear agenda on the issue. Madhesi parties have been strongly demanding a
single autonomous Tarai state with their slogan of ‘One Madhes, One State’. UML has been taking
a middle ground with their vision of future federal states based on the lines of ethnicity, geography,
history and language.
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Nevertheless, with the restructuring of the
state becoming the main agenda among
various political actors, issues of justice, fair
representation, and proportional
participation will remain at the forefront
of debates and guide the demands of various
hitherto marginalised communities and
groups. Whether and to what extent the
present and future political order is able to
counter these various forms of historically
produced and perpetuated social injustices
and discriminations is yet to be seen, but it
certainly depends on the strong political will
and consensus among major political
actors.
It needs to be stressed that there is still a
large gap between the conceptualisation of
social justice and its actual practice and
delivery in Nepal. To some extent, this
contradiction between the discourses of
social justice in the political rhetoric and its
actual reality in day-to-day practice can be
attributed to their constantly evolving and
frequently contested interpretations and
articulations. Social justice is not a static and
rigid concept but a hybridised and dynamic
notion that changes over time. With a
multiplicity of conceptions and meanings,
justice may mean different things to
different people, groups, contexts, space and
time. These discourses of social justice are
mediated by the relative influence of
diversity of actors and interest groups
(including international donors and INGOs,
government, political parties, civil society,
ordinary people, and various disadvantaged
groups), and shaped by different
interpretations based on diverse modalities
of configurations of power among different
social and cultural agencies.
As mentioned earlier the concept of justice
in Nepal has, at its historical and cultural
roots, the Hindu notion of dharma and
various other indigenous traditions.
However, the concept of justice, as it is
understood today in contemporary Nepal,
also contains elements adapted and
borrowed from elsewhere through
experiences and external networks as a
result of a globalised world order. Despite a
usual two-way interaction between the
older and modern justice approaches, it is to
be noted that in many circumstances in
Nepal, these older and modern conceptions
co-exist and do not engage each other.
Modern concepts of justice circulate within
the public sphere of national politics, the
media, civil society activism, but people’s
attitudes, behaviours and practices are still
governed by various traditional rules and
cultural norms. As a result, people selectively
apply one set of ideas of justice to the sphere
of everyday life and ordinary interactions,
and another set of ideas in public debates
about the nation and policy. This, in turn,
has a bearing on the extent and limitations
of national level debates and policies to
influence and address existing injustices and
inequalities on the ground.
CONCLUSION
As this paper has shown, the discourse of
social justice has evolved historically over
time in Nepal as a result of internal and
external factors, picking various ideas from
a variety of sources and actors, and its
meaning has shifted gradually from
previous indigenous understandings. An
interpretation based solely on the Hindu and
Buddhist notion of dharma has evolved into
one based on the principle of equality,
which has lately incorporated ideas of
procedural justice (fairness, inclusiveness,
proportional representation and
participation) and libertarian values of
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dignity and freedom. Behind this shift and
broadening of the concept lies the influence
of internal dynamics (for example, the
changing role of religion and culture, social
and political movements, and education) as
well as exogenous factors (for example, the
influence of outside world affairs, the
transfer of global ideas, and the influence of
aid donors).
In present-day Nepal, there are various
dimensions of social injustices and
inequalities, arising from complexities of
differences based on class, caste, ethnicity,
gender, religion, culture, and region. Without
focusing on the priorities and concerns of
various disadvantaged groups who have
been marginalised historically, no country
can achieve a fair and just social system.
This is particularly true in the case of Nepal,
which is a country of ‘unequal citizens’,
where there are disparities between the rich
and the poor, Brahman-Chhetris and other
caste and ethnic groups, Pahades and
Madhesis, men and women, cities and
villages, and where there is development
which only benefits one set of people while
neglecting the other. In that sense, the aim
of addressing and realising social justice in
the complex case of Nepal is a long journey,
the first step of which needs to focus on
adequately addressing various dimensions
of historically produced and perpetuated
social injustices.
Social justice in Nepal can only be acheived
through the realisation of human dignity
(and therefore respectful recognition of
various marginal groups), equality of social
security, resources and opportunities. This
necessarily implies expanding basic rights,
ending discrimination, securing long-term
communal property rights, ending the
‘untouchability’ of the Dalits, and inclusion
in national social policies and practices. The
constitution-building process in Nepal is an
opportunity to create the necessary
framework within which the conditions for
realisation and delivery of justice can be
envisioned with a fair provision and
distribution of rights and liberties, resources
and opportunities within Nepal’s polity,
economy and society. Most importantly, as
this paper has stressed, for the realisation
of any real sense of social justice it is
essential that the current restructuring
agenda and future public policies of Nepal
should address the special needs and
aspirations of historically disadvantaged
groups that are marginalised in various
forms and degrees.
It is also argued that the national policies
that principally has the provisions and
practices of distribution of benefits and
services based on the notion of equality,
have failed to recognise the special concerns
and priorities of the poor and disadvantaged
groups, who actually require special
provisions and practical actions with fair
and equitable treatments. Claims of justice
by mere cosmetic changes and insistence
on the existence of policy measures that
ensure equal treatment for all (based on the
notion of equality) will not be sufficient to
address the historically inherited socio-
economic divisions between the
marginalised and dominant groups. To
overcome these differences, there should be
special arrangements and more affirmative
action for these groups (for example, in the
form of reservation and proportional
representation) in order to bring them into
an equitable ‘original position’ from which
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mutually agreeable social contracts can be
explored. In that sense, Nepal’s ongoing
political transition and constitution-making
process should provide an opportunity for
different social actors, in particular the
historically marginalised groups, to agree
to a ‘basic structure’ from which a more
meaningful social contract is developed and
their dream for equitable and inclusive ‘new
Nepal’ is fulfilled.
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